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Abstract
Over the course of the 20th century American wages increased by a factor of about
100, while the wages of professional baseball players increased by a factor of 450, but
that increase was neither smooth nor consistent. We use a unique and expansive dataset
of salaries and performance variables of Major League Baseball pitchers that spans over
400 players and 60 years during the reserve clause era to identify factors that determine
salaries and examine how the importance of various factors have changed over time.
We employ a Markov regime-switching regression model borrowed from the macroeco-
nomics literature which allows regression coeﬃcients to switch exogenously between two
or more values as time progresses. This method lets us identify changes in wage deter-
mination that may have occurred because of a change in the league's competitiveness,
a change in the relative bargaining power between players and teams, or other factors
that may be unknown or unobservable. We ﬁnd that even though Major League Base-
ball was a tightly controlled monopsony with the reserve clause, there was a signiﬁcant
shift in salary determination that lasted from the Great Depression until after World
War II where players' salaries were more highly linked to their recent performance.
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1 Introduction
Major League Baseball (MLB) players are among the highest paid workers in the American
economy. Their minimum salaries are several times that of the average American salary, and
the average wages are an even greater multiple. They enjoy a minimum salary of $400,000
per year, an average salary exceeding $2 million per year, guaranteed contracts, and arguably
the strongest union in American history. Stories of the ﬁnancial escapades of professional
baseball teams and the salaries they pay their employees are common in the sports and
business press.
It was not always this way however. It was not until the mid 1970s when professional
baseball players blazed the trail for all professional athletes by gaining the right to bargain
competitively for their wages. Before that time, the reserve clause meant players were bound
to their original employer for the duration of their careers. The labor market for ballplayers
was a classic monopsony. Furthermore, players typically had a very low opportunity cost to
play in MLB; most had little schooling and the only opportunities were outside of professional
sports.
So what determines the salary of a player in such an environment? Market pressures
surely did not force owners to pay players salaries commensurate with their marginal rev-
enue product. A seminal work by Scully (1974) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant degree of monopsonistic
exploitation of players during this time. However, neither were players all paid the same
salary, despite their opportunity costs being very similar. Evidence suggests that salaries
were not simply raised on an annual basis for all players at steady rates,1 and even a casual
look at players salaries reveals that higher performing players were often more highly paid.
It's possible then that subtle market forces tied salaries to productivity even though
competition was severely restricted, but there is no reason to think this relationship remained
constant for the near century that the reserve clause bound all players to one employer. For
example, during this time there were two world wars and a Great Depression that impacted
both the supply of players and the demand among fans for professional sports, all of which
can change the subtle forces that inﬂuence players', albeit limited, negotiating power. It's
also possible that performance characteristics, beyond wins and losses, appealed to fans and
1See Haupert (2009) for a discussion of MLB wages during diﬀerent labor regimes.
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that this appeal evolved over the decades.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate how experience and productivity inﬂuenced
salaries during the period of the reserve clause, paying careful attention to how this relation-
ship changed over time. We have a unique and extensive dataset that includes player data on
salary and productivity (performance statistics) for over 400 players for over 60 years (1911
through 1973). All the previous literature concerning baseball salaries has been limited to
data from one to ﬁve years, and only rarely have datasets on this topic covered as many
as ten years.2 Indeed, such a long panel including reliable measures of worker productivity,
precise salaries, and experience is rare even in the labor economics literature as a whole.
The long panel allows us to answer an important question that to date has been diﬃcult to
impossible to address: Can changes in the relationship between performance and salary be
identiﬁed over time? If so, this signals subtle changes in bargaining power or market forces
during the reserve clause that would not otherwise be directly observable.
To answer this question we employ a Markov-regime-switching regression procedure,
where each regression coeﬃcient can switch between two or more values (i.e. switch regimes)
as time progresses.3 A regime is deﬁned by a particular set of regression coeﬃcients, so the
regression line that explains the relationship between the dependent and explanatory vari-
ables can change as time goes on. The procedure allows for only a ﬁxed number of regimes,
but has the ﬂexibility to allow any number of switches between the regimes. A regime change
aﬀects all players at the same time, so a change in a coeﬃcient on a performance variable
(where salary is the dependent variable) would indicate owners put a higher value on per-
formance and pay their players accordingly, or that players hold more bargaining power and
are more capable of attracting higher salaries for good performance. The exogenous nature
of the switching allows switching to occur for unknown or unmeasurable reasons and it is
a change in the relationship of the dependent variable and independent variables that trig-
gers the identiﬁcation of such a switch. For simplicity of interpretation and computational
tractability, we assume the possibility of only two regimes which allows us to identify periods
2Section 3 has a more detailed discussion of this literature.
3A time-ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regression can also identify time variations in the average salary while ac-
counting for other explantory variables, but this method does not otherwise allow structure of the regression
relationship to change. We chose a regime switching procedure instead to speciﬁcally capture changes in the
relationship of the dependent variable (salary) and the explanatory variables (performance and experience)
over time.
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where players have relatively weak bargaining power versus periods with relatively strong
bargaining power. We identify the period between the Great Depression and the end of
World War II as a period in which players had a higher average pay and were more highly
paid for good performance.
2 Historical Background
From its earliest days, Major League Baseball has been a monopsonistic employer. Beginning
in 1876 with the founding of the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (NL) the
industry was designed such that employers (team owners) minimized the ability of employees
(players) to sell their services competitively. The name chosen for this new league was
signiﬁcant because up until this time, all baseball organizations had been player associations.
Now, as the name implied, players were to be employees of a club and members of a league.
The new league provided for a new order, ingeniously designed to be nourished on both
monopoly and competition. Under its aegis, member clubs were to compete with each other
for renown and receipts, but only within the conﬁnes of a prescribed pattern.4 Ultimately
both stability and the disruption of bitter labor disputes would result from the formation of
the National League. Stability would bring about a superior brand of baseball, considered
the best in the world. Labor problems were key in the formation of competing leagues.5 All
of these failed, except the American League, which eventually partnered with the National
League to form what is to today known as Major League Baseball.
For much of the ﬁrst century after the formation of the National League the players had
little say in any aﬀairs of their clubs and no representation in the governing institutions
of the League. Club executives simply presented contracts to their players and refused
to negotiate. Clubs used a variety of measures to keep players in line, including sobriety
regulations and medical examinations by club doctors and suspensions for poor play, illness
or insubordination. If a player violated any club directives, he could even be blacklisted
from professional baseball until he repented.
4Seymour (1960), page 85.
5Failed competitors and their years of operation: Union Association 1884, American Association 1882-91,
Players League 1890, Federal League 1914-15. The American League was formed as a competing league in
1901 and merged with the National League in 1903.
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Team owners formalized their control over the players with the adoption of the reserve
clause following the 1879 season. Owners agreed that each of them would reserve, or
keep oﬀ the market, ﬁve players of their eleven man rosters for the following year. The
list of reserved players was circulated among all owners, and each agreed not to employ or
even negotiate with any other team's reserved players. The plan was initially designed to
prevent rich teams from acquiring all the best players, or so they claimed. Conveniently, it
also created a monopsony labor market that owners could exploit. The number of reserved
players slowly increased over the years until entire club rosters were designated as reserved.
Beginning in 1887 the list became a clause in the standard player contract. The reserve
clause remained intact for nearly a century, turning the baseball labor market into a tightly
controlled monopsony.
With baseball players bound to one employer in perpetuity by the reserve clause, the
labor market for ballplayers was a classic monopsony. Players were free to negotiate with
prospective employers only for their ﬁrst contract, usually as a young man, in many cases even
a minor. At this age the prospects for any player were extremely uncertain. In addition, most
unschooled young potential ballplayers lacked both the sophistication and the knowledge of
the market to do much, if any, bargaining. As a result, the ﬁrst contract usually imparted
little to the ballplayer in the way of bargaining leverage. This began to change after World
War II when the rules regarding bonus payments were liberalized, allowing some young
players to receive hefty signing bonuses. What did not change, however, was the presence of
the reserve clause in the standard player contract.
Once signed to a professional contract, players lost control of their fate as a professional
baseball player unless they were released from that contract at the discretion of the team.
The reserve clause gave teams the ability to renew a player's contract in perpetuity on terms
dictated by the team. The sale of contracts from one team to another was a common method
of raising revenue for the sellers and building a better club for the buyers. Consistent in all
of this was the lack of any input by the player. His only choice was to play for the new team
or look for a job in a diﬀerent line of work.
In this environment the only explicit leverage a player could exert was to threaten to hold
out his services. For most players this was not a realistic advantage, as the monopsony MLB
held down the number of viable franchises in the league, and hence the number of employed
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ballplayers. As a result, there were many players in lesser leagues scattered around the
country who were viable substitutes for the player who held out his services. A holdout
strategy was only possible for the highest quality players at the peak of their career, for
whom a viable substitute did not exist. Even then, holdouts were rarely successful, as the
opportunity cost of a holdout was much higher for the players than the teams.
Joe DiMaggio, for example, staged a hold-out in the spring of 1938. At the time he was
arguably the best baseball player in the world. He was a celebrity and a fan favorite with
enormous drawing power. If anybody should have been able to execute a successful holdout,
it would have been Joe DiMaggio in 1938. The Yankees were coming oﬀ back-to-back World
Series championships and their highest attendance in seven years. Not since Babe Ruth
retired had the team done so well on or oﬀ the ﬁeld. For his contribution, DiMaggio had just
put together two of the ﬁnest seasons in baseball history, and the fact that they were his ﬁrst
two seasons made this performance all the more remarkable. Connie Mack, the venerable
owner of the Philadelphia Athletics and a ﬁfty year baseball veteran, called him the greatest
drawing card in the game. DiMaggio was a full-ﬂedged superstar.
When he asked for a raise from $15,000 to $40,000 it seemed to him like a reasonable
request. In fact, his marginal revenue product (MRP) that year was approximately $400,000,
so even at $40,000 the club would be getting a steal.6 However, DiMaggio discovered that
management was holding all the cards. Not only was the reserve clause working against him,
but so was the press, and as a result, the fans.
DiMaggio threatened to stage an indeﬁnite holdout, but three days after the season
started, he caved in. Yankee owner Jacob Ruppert triumphantly shared his telegram with
the press: Your terms accepted, adding that DiMaggio's salary would be docked each day
until his manager deemed him ready to play. That turned out to be nearly two weeks and
almost $1500 into the season. Perhaps worse than the lost salary was the lost adulation of
the fans, who had been turned against DiMaggio.
Besides the twin cannons of the reserve clause and the press applying pressure on a
holdout, the teams could rely on their monopoly control of the industry to always have a
stockpile of available players on hand to bring to the club in place of a malcontent or fading
talent. The Yankees threatened that if the great DiMaggio held out, they would simply
6See Haupert (2009).
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proceed with backup Myril Hoag in his place. Throughout the spring Hoag batted .352,
lending credence to that threat.
This type of market structure changed dramatically in 1975 with the elimination of
the reserve clause. The growing power of the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA), formed in 1952, led to a collective bargaining agreement in 1968, and the 1970
ruling by the National Labor Relations Board that MLB and the MLBPA use outside arbi-
trators for resolving grievances. This ultimately led to free agency when an arbitrator ruled
in 1975 that the reserve clause was not indeﬁnite, creating the ﬁrst true free agents in 1976.
The players and owners negotiated the present system of restricted free agency, which gives
owners the exclusive right to bargain with a player for the ﬁrst six years of his contract.7
Thereafter, a player is free to negotiate with any team. In its original iteration players were
allowed to negotiate with only a limited number of clubs, but this quickly gave way to an
unfettered market, in which players were granted the right to sell their services to the highest
bidder. Players are still bound to their teams for the ﬁrst six years of their contract before
becoming eligible for free agency. However, after two years they are eligible for salary arbi-
tration. Prior to this eligibility for arbitration, players are subject to the salary dictates of
their teams, though there is a minimum salary and a maximum allowable salary reduction
from year to year.
3 Literature
The seminal work in the area of ballplayer wages is Scully (1974), who ﬁrst attempted to
crudely measure the economic loss to the players8 as a result of the reserve clause. Scully
used limited salary data from the 1968 and 1969 seasons to calculate the MRP of players
and compare that to actual salaries. To analyze pitchers, he regressed the log of salary on
lifetime percentage of innings pitched (IP%), the ratio of strikeouts to walks (K/BB), and a
variable for experience. Scully notes that he employed a variety of performance measures in
numerous regressions, but the fact that one performance measure or another or one plausible
eﬀect or another does not appear in the regression equations reported here does not mean
7For a compelling history of these negotiations, see Miller (1991).
8Page 915.
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that the measure or the eﬀect was not associated with salary variations.9 In fact, most of
the variables he considered were highly correlated with players' salaries, but their unique
eﬀects could not be isolated. For pitchers, these other variables included games won per
full season played, innings pitched per full season, career games won, career innings pitched,
seasons pitched and diﬀerences between performance last year and lifetime performance. The
only performance variable he could not ﬁnd signiﬁcant was Earned Run Average (ERA). In
a later study, Scully (1989) incorporated free agency into his lifetime K/BB and lifetime
IP% variables. He found lifetime K/BB ratio to be the single best measure of pitching
performance and noted that player salaries tended to rise automatically over time with
experience independently of average lifetime performance. In general, he ﬁnds four factors
that are most important in determining salary: player performance, the weight of the player's
contributions to team performance, years of MLB experience, and the enhanced bargaining
power of being a superstar.
Scholars following Scully tweaked his MRP or team revenue equations, developed addi-
tional or alternate measures of player performance that they regressed on player salaries, or
asked slightly diﬀerent questions based on the concept of measuring the relationship between
player performance and salary.
In a more general study of whether workers are paid their MRP, Frank (1984) ﬁnds that
within ﬁrms, wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values.10
Frank claimed that many ﬁrms tended to follow wage formulas linked to experience, educa-
tion and ﬁrm tenure despite diﬀerences in worker productivity, because of the diﬃculty in
monitoring productivity. He claims that employees may also prefer this type of compensa-
tion as a means of smoothing income over time rather than the vagaries of annual income
changes tied to productivity changes. This is interesting if one assumes that it is easier to
give a small annual raise to a player than to increase his salary substantially after a good
year and then to decrease it correspondingly after a bad year.
Frank notes that it is often suggested that 'equity considerations' account for why inter-
nal wage structures are so much more egalitarian than the ones predicted by the marginal
productivity theory of wages... but it raises the question of why, if equity is truly what they
9Scully (1974), page 934 footnote.
10Page 549.
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seek, do the best workers in existing ﬁrms not join new ﬁrms with other workers who are just
as productive as themselves?11 The explanation in baseball is quite simple: until 1976, the
reserve clause prevented this. And after 1976, a popular opinion is that the richest teams do
exactly this: pay the highest salaries to the best players (read New York Yankees).
Zimbalist (1992b) ﬁnds evidence for this hypothesis in MLB by breaking his sample into
experience categories consistent with player bargaining leverage. Players with less than three
years experience, who were not eligible for arbitration or free agency, comprise the ﬁrst group.
The second group were payers with 3-5 years of experience, those who qualiﬁed for arbitration
but not free agency. The ﬁnal group had six or more years experience, thus qualifying for
free agency. He found a strong positive correlation between salary and bargaining power, as
measured by experience level.
A number of other studies have also conﬁrmed the importance of bargaining power in
determining player salaries during the Free Agency era, including Krautmann and Oppen-
heimer (2002), Kahn (1993) and MacDonald and Reynolds (1994). These studies incorporate
contract duration and bargaining environment into the equation, regressing salaries on length
of contract and arbitration eligible, free agent eligible, and ﬁnal year of contract.
There has been a signiﬁcant literature interested in identifying performance variables
most important for salary determination, and the appropriate structural form for these
variables in a regression relationship. For example, MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) use
runs scored and ERA instead of the slugging average and walks-to-strikeout ratio measures
used by Scully. They also incorporated a dummy variable taking on the value of one if the
team's winning percentage fell below .500 averaged over the two previous seasons.
Krautmann (1999) ﬁnds that a player's defensive position is an important factor in de-
termining salary. He ﬁnds statistically signiﬁcant dummy variables that suggest, all else
remaining equal, shortstops and catchers receive higher salaries than players at other posi-
tions. Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley (2003) further show that a pitcher's role (starters,
long relievers, or closers) importantly interacts with performance variables in determining
salaries. When splitting their sample of pitchers along these roles, they ﬁnd ERA and K/IP
important for starting pitchers; wins, K/IP, left-handed dummy, and team total revenue
important for long relievers; and ERA, Saves, and IP important for closers. They suggest
11Page 569.
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aggregating pitchers leads to false outcomes. When aggregating pitchers they ﬁnd team total
revenue, lefty dummy, ERA, wins, saves, IP, K/IP, and dummies for relievers and stoppers
all signiﬁcant.
A number of authors have examined the importance experience and age play, along
with performance variables. Hoaglin and Velleman (1995) ﬁnd that salary does not increase
linearly with experience, but instead needs to be modeled either as a quadratic function,
or even better as a piecewise linear pattern, where salary grows linearly for the ﬁrst seven
years of experience and levels oﬀ after that. Fort (1992) ﬁnds that experience and age are
important in determining salary, but that both variables are important separately, despite the
obvious correlation. Both age and experience aﬀect players most at the early and later stages
of their careers. In other words, an extra year of age and experience are more signiﬁcant to
younger players (positively) and older players (negatively). Fort (1992) also ﬁnds evidence
that recent performance variables are more important for salary determination than career-
to-date performance variables.
Burger and Walters (2003) ﬁnd evidence that macroeconomic variables have been im-
portant in determining salary in the Free Agency era. They ﬁnd that market size and team
performance interact to increase the MRP and thus the salary of players on winning teams
located in large markets. They estimate that teams in the largest markets derive as much as
six times more additional revenue from an additional win. These teams are therefore willing
to pay more for free agents.
The consistency in these studies is their agreement that experience and bargaining status
matter in wages and that performance variables should be lagged. There is some variation
on which performance variables to use, and each study ﬁnds diﬀerent signiﬁcant experience
variables, which is not surprising given Scully's initial analysis. More recent work has focused
on disaggregating player samples by sub-specialty. One other similarity in the studies is the
very short time periods each looked at. Most have used time periods ranging from one to
ﬁve years. Fort (1992) used a ten year period. Haupert (2009), using data from the New
York Yankees ﬁnancial records has looked at a longer time period and a novel performance
variable, win shares.
While the present work is based on the ﬁndings of previous research, we seek to both
expand and diﬀerentiate from the previous literature. We look at a much longer time series
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than all previous studies, beginning in 1911 and going through 1973 when the reserve clause
era ended, a period spanning major events such as the Great Depression and two world wars.
The long time span allows us to address a new issue and apply a new methodology: we seek
not so much to identify speciﬁc factors behind salary determination, but rather determine
whether the structural relationship between experience, performance, and salary has changed
over time, and when such changes occurred.
4 Methodology
4.1 Data
We seek to explore how experience, age, and measures of performance inﬂuence salary during
the reserve clause era. We begin with annual salary data for 403 pitchers spanning 63 years
from 1911 through 1973 (for a total of 2132 observations). The top panel of Figure 1 shows
the average nominal salary for each year in the sample. Since salaries grow exponentially,
the middle panel of the ﬁgure shows the log of the average nominal salary along with a linear
trend line, and the bottom panel shows the diﬀerence from the log salary from the trend.
A casual look at the deviation of log-salary from the linear trend reveals that the average
growth of Major League Baseball players' salaries is not constant during the reserve era, and
there are indeed long lasting deviations from the long-run growth path. Most notable is the
behavior of salaries from the Great Depression through the end of World War II compared to
the years before and after this period. This period stands out as salaries remain below their
average growth trend for an extended period of time, even though such dips in salary were
not completely unprecedented and similar dips in salary would return. The graph reveals
short-lived dips in salary of similar magnitude occurring in the early 1910s and late 1950s.
The regime-switching estimation procedure that follows in the next subsection enables us to
determine whether such changes in salary can be explained by common explanatory variables,
or whether and when there were persistent changes in the structural relationship between
salary and explanatory variables.
Explanatory variables we consider are experience (measured as the number of years in
the league), age, and one-year-lagged performance variables: numbers of wins as a ratio
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of games played (W/G), earned run average (ERA), and the ratio of strikeouts to innings
pitched (K/IP). There are many other performance statistics one could include, such as
hits or runs allowed, walks, and popular composite measures such as the ratio of walks and
hits to innings pitched, and the ratio of strikeouts to walks. Since all these measures are
highly correlated, including too many creates multicolinearity problems, especially when it
comes regime switching models because the eﬀect of a performance statistic in one regime is
related to the eﬀect of the same and other performance statistics in another regime. As we
mentioned previously, Scully (1974) reports similar multicolinearity problems in his analysis.
Given these problems, and since the purpose of this paper is not to identify what performance
measures best explain salary, but just to see the impact on salary of performance as a whole
changes across time, we only consider a short list of performance variables.
4.2 Model
A regime switching regression model allows the relationship between the salary and its
explanatory variables to evolve over time. Speciﬁcally, the model allows for more than one
regression equation to describe the data, where in a given time period, one regression line
may be describing the data, but in the next time period, there may be an exogenous switch to
another regression line. A regime is deﬁned as the state of the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables being related to each other with a speciﬁc regression line. Exogenous
regime-switching methods are appropriate when the relationship between the dependent and
explanatory variables varies over time for reasons that are either unmeasurable or unknown,
and the timing of such changes in the regression relationship are unknown. Regime-switching
methods are preferable to other time-varying coeﬃcient methods12 when changes may not
be continuous or gradual, but occur suddenly and are possibly long lasting.
We employ a Markov-switching regime approach that is popular in the macroeconomics
literature, described by Kim (1994) and in depth by Kim and Nelson (1999b).13 The method
12With time series data, a Kalman ﬁlter can be used to estimate a model with time-varying regression
coeﬃcients, where the coeﬃcients may evolve according to their own autoregressive process and/or depend
on explanatory variables. See Hamilton (1989), Chapter 13 for a foundation for structuring and estimating
such models.
13Kim and Nelson (1999a) use the method to ﬁnd regime switches in the volatility of shocks that drive
the business cycle. Many authors after him have used it to detect changes in monetary policy and/or
macroeconomic volatility.
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requires restricting the number of possible regimes to some small ﬁxed value such as two or
three, but the procedure allows for an arbitrary number of switches between the possible
regimes over the sample period, which can account for a number of short-lived regimes and/or
long-lasting regimes, allowing for a quite ﬂexible ﬁt to the data. It is for this reason the
Markov-switching procedure was chosen over competing methods such as Bai and Perron
(1998), which restricts the number of regime changes equal to the number of possible unique
regimes allowed.
Consider the following standard (no switching) pooled panel regression model,
yi,t = x
′
i,tβ + ei,t, ei,t ∼ N (0, σ2), (1)
where subscript i denotes an individual MLB pitcher, subscript t denotes a given time period,
yi,t is the observed value for the dependent variable for individual i at time t, xi,t is a vector
of explanatory variables that can include a constant for individual i at time t, β is a vector
of coeﬃcients, and ei,t is an independently normally distributed error term with variance
given by σ2.14 For our application, yi,t denotes the natural log of salary; and xi,t includes
a constant, time (measured as number of years since the beginning of the sample, 1911),
players' age, age squared, players' years of experience, experience squared, and one year
lagged performance variables: W/G, ERA, and K/IP.
A single regression line, that is a single set of estimates for the coeﬃcients in β and the
variance σ2, can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). We extend this model by
considering the following regime switching panel model,
yi,t = x
′
i,tβ(st) + ei,t, ei,t ∼ N (0, σ2(st)), (2)
where st ∈ {1, 2, .., S} denotes which state, or regime, the regression relationship is in at
time t, and S is the possible number of regimes. The regression coeﬃcients are given by,
β(st) = βk if and only if st = k; and the variance is given by σ
2(st) = σ
2
k if and only if st = k.
We consider a model with only two regimes (S = 2). When the league is in Regime
14For the standard pooled panel regression model, the assumption that the error term is normally dis-
tributed is not necessary. We make this assumption at the introduction of the model because it will be
necessary in order to estimate the regime switching panel model by maximum likelihood.
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1, the regression relationship is characterized by parameters β1 and σ
2
1; when the league
is in Regime 2, the regression relationship is characterized by parameters β2 and σ
2
2. The
probability of being in each regime in each time period evolves according to a Markov process.
That is, it evolves exogenously, and depends only on which regime the league was in during
the previous time period. Let the probability the league is in Regime 1, given it was in
Regime 1 in the previous period, be given by p ∈ (0, 1); and the probability the league is in
Regime 2, given it was in Regime 2 in the previous period, be given by q ∈ (0, 1). These
transition probabilities are estimated along with the regression coeﬃcients and error term
variance for each regime.
Let Etst = [P (st = 1) P (st = 2)]
′ denote the time t expected state, that is the expected
probability that the labor market is in each possible regime, where P (st = 1)+P (st = 2) = 1.
Given the Markov transition probabilities p and q, the expected state evolves according to,
Etst =
 p (1− p)
(1− q) q
Etst−1
Note we impose the structure that st has no i subscript. This implies all players in
the sample are in the same regime during a given year. Such changes might happen for
a number of reasons: changes in the league's competitiveness can change how players are
rewarded, downswings and upswings in the economy can impact players' salaries, or changes
in players bargaining power can inﬂuence the importance of performance variables. Finally,
it is possible there have been changes in the way players are compensated, but the literature
may not yet have answers, or many not yet have even detected that such changes have
occurred. The structure of the Markov switching procedure allows us to detect whether and
when such changes have occurred, making use of only the information in the dependent and
independent variables.
We may think of the two regimes as representing periods in which recent productivity
measures are highly valued when it comes to determining salary versus periods where they
had relatively low value. Admittedly, considering only two regimes is a simpliﬁcation to ac-
tual changes in the way salaries are determined. While the period from the Great Depression
though the end of World War II may be characterized by one regime, it seems unlikely that
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salary determination in the period immediately prior and immediately afterword should be
identical. That is, it is unlikely the same set of coeﬃcients should characterize the period
prior to 1933 and the period after 1946, simply because the period from 1933-1946 may be
characterized by a unique set of regression coeﬃcients. A two-regime model makes the esti-
mation procedure tractable, while still allowing some ﬂexibility in the coeﬃcients. Allowing
more regimes multiplies the number of regression coeﬃcients to estimate when there may
be a signiﬁcant degree of correlation between regression coeﬃcients from diﬀerent regimes.
Considering more regimes also leads to an exponential increase in the number of transi-
tion probabilities to estimate. The two-regime model is suﬃcient to address our qualitative
question concerning the existence and description of changes in the structural relationship
between pay and performance change over the reserve clause era. The model would be in-
suﬃcient to precisely quantify the impact of each explanatory variable on salary over such a
long time horizon if changes in the relationship beyond the strict two-regime assumption are
possible. The ﬁndings from the present paper could motivate separate research that focuses
exclusively on a given time period to answer this second question.
We estimate the pooled panel regression model using both OLS and regime switching.
Hamilton (1989) describes a maximum likelihood procedure for estimating a regime switching
model with a single time series, which we extend to a pooled regression panel as described
in Appendix A.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the regime switching regression and OLS regression (single regression line, no
regime switching) results for comparison. The OLS results indicate all explanatory variables
signiﬁcantly explain Major League salaries. The performance variables have the expected
signs: ERA is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, and K/IP and W/G are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that recent player
performance inﬂuences salary in the reserve clause era, despite the tightly controlled monop-
sony power of MLB team owners.
The other explanatory variables oﬀer additional insight into how players' salaries evolve.
The positive coeﬃcient on time is a measure of the average growth rate of players' salaries.
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The positive coeﬃcient on age and experience and the negative coeﬃcient on age squared and
experience squared indicate there is strong evidence that age and experience each have their
own role in determining salary, despite the obvious large positive correlation. The regression
coeﬃcients on age and age squared suggest that players salaries grow with age until they
reach age 29.8 and then begin to decline. The coeﬃcients on experience and experience
squared suggest salary grows with experience over most players' careers, but at a decreasing
rate and begins to decline only after 22.0 years of experience.
The regime switching results in Table 1 show evidence for diﬀerences in regimes over the
sample. The columns 'Regime 1' and 'Regime 2' report the regression coeﬃcients in each
regime, and the ﬁnal column reports the diﬀerence between the two regimes along with the
standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence. There is a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two regimes in the impact of performance variables K/IP and ERA,
the impact of age, and the constant term. The coeﬃcients suggest that during Regime
2 players salaries more heavily depend on recent performance. The coeﬃcient on ERA is
-0.0023 in Regime 1 versus -0.0101 in Regime 2, which is more than four times larger in
magnitude in Regime 2 than Regime 1. The coeﬃcient on K/IP also increases signiﬁcantly
in magnitude, more than doubling from 0.1866 in Regime 1 to 0.4461 in Regime 2. The
impact of the ﬁnal performance variable, W/G, does not change signiﬁcantly between the two
regimes. Since number of wins is more highly related to team performance than individual
performance, the results suggest individual performance becomes a relatively more important
factor behind salary in Regime 2.
The coeﬃcients on age and age squared suggest the impact of age on salary is less
important in Regime 2. The coeﬃcients imply players salaries begin to decline with age at
age 31.5 in Regime 1 and age 29.4 in Regime 2. The smaller squared term in Regime 2
also indicates a smaller ascent of salary up to age 29.4 and a smaller descent after this age.
While individual performance is relatively more important in Regime 2, age is relatively less
important.
Finally, the constant term is statistically signiﬁcantly higher in Regime 2 which means
accounting for all the explanatory variables, the relatively greater importance for individual
performance, and the relatively lower inﬂuence of age, pitchers receive a higher average salary
in Regime 2.
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The R-squared values at the bottom of Table 1 show a high degree of explanatory power
for both the OLS and regime switching regressions. We also compute a pseudo R-squared
value to determine the percentage of variability in the OLS residuals that can be explained by
extending the model to allow for regime switching. The calculation for the pseudo R-squared
value is given by,
Pseudo R2RS/OLS =
SSEOLS − SSERS
SSEOLS
, (3)
where SSEOLS and SSERS are the sum of squared error measures for the OLS and regime
switching regression models, respectively. Since the single regime model (OLS) is a special
case of the more general two-regime switching model (RS), it follows that SSEOLS ≥ SSERS
and these will be equal only when the regime switching structure adds zero explanatory
power. The value reported in Table 1 indicates about 14% of the unexplained variability in
the standard OLS regression can be explained by the two-regime model.
Hamilton (1989) describes a smoothing method for estimating the timing of regime
changes. Speciﬁcally, the method uses the information from the full dataset to estimate
the probability each time period is described by each regime. The computational details are
in Appendix B. Figure 2 shows a plot of the probability the labor market is in Regime 2 over
the sample period. The estimated probabilities are always very close to 0.0 (high likelihood
in Regime 1) or very close to 1.0 (high likelihood in Regime 2), indicating for every period
there is very strong evidence the labor market is in the given regime. Table 2 spells out
precisely what years the labor market is in each regime.
The results show a number of regime switches early in the sample. The labor market
begins in Regime 2 at the beginning of the sample, but switches to Regime 1 during the
two year recession from January 1913 - December 1914. The market returns to Regime 2 in
1917, but again switches to Regime 1 in 1920 when the economy again falls into recession
in January 1920. The market remained in Regime 1 from 1920 through 1932, through three
recessions and the onset of the Great Depression.
A change to Regime 2 occurs in 1933 and the labor market remains here through two
more recessions and through the Second World War and until 1947. We saw earlier that
salaries in this period were signiﬁcantly below their long-run growth path. Results from the
regime switching model sheds more light on what was happening to the labor market during
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this period. During this time, pay was more highly associated with individual performance.
Moreover, a higher constant term in Regime 2 indicates that even though an exclusive look at
salaries at the beginning of this section suggested a lower average salary, after accounting for
all the explanatory variables, and the changing nature of their importance across regimes,
base pay was actually higher. After 1947 and through the end of the reserve clause, the
labor market returned to Regime 1 and remained there, where the link between pay and
performance was relatively smaller.
6 Conclusion
The reserve clause in Major League Baseball bound players to their original employer for
the duration of their baseball careers. The opportunity cost for players to play in the Major
League was also extremely low, which prevented players from staging credible holdouts to
eﬀectively bargain for higher salary. Despite the complete explicit control owners had over
salary negotiations, we ﬁnd that salaries did indeed depend on individual players' recent
performance, but there were a number of abrupt changes in the relationship between salary
and its explanatory variables over the sample period. We employ a unique and extensive
panel dataset of player salaries and performance statistics spanning over six decades of the
reserve clause and a unique application of Markov regime switching methods to panel data
to determine whether the relationship of pay and performance changed over time. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence for regime switching and a moderate increase in explanatory power when
extending a standard (single-regime) regression model to one that allows for two regimes.
Most notably, we ﬁnd a long-lasting period from 1933-1947 when salaries were more highly
linked to individual performance, salaries were less dependent on age, and base pay was
higher when accounting for the explanatory variables and its changing nature across regimes.
A Filtering Procedure
Hamilton (1989) describes an iterative procedure to evaluate a likelihood function for Markov
regime switching for a single time series. In this appendix we describe how we extend his
method to a pooled panel regression model. Consider the following pooled regression model
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with regime switching,
yi,t = x
′
i,tβ(st) + ei,t, (A1)
where subscript i denotes a given individual, subscript t denotes a given time period, xi,t
is a vector of explanatory variables that may include both variables that vary across time
for an individual and variables that remain constant over time. The regime state is given
by st ∈ {1, .., S} where S is the number of regimes. The vector of coeﬃcients is given by
β(st) = βk if st = k, and the error term is independently and identically normally distributed,
ei,t ∼ N [0, σ(st)], where the standard deviation is given by σ(st) = σk if st = k. The regime
state, st, evolves according to the Markov chain, P (st = k | st−1 = j,Ψt−1) = pjk, where pjk
denotes the probability the economy switches from state j to state k as time enters period
t and is another parameter to be estimated along with the other regression parameters, and
Ψt−1 simply denotes all information up through period t− 1.
Given the error term ei,t is normally distributed, if st = k was known, the probability
density function for yi,t is given by,
f(yi,t | st = k,Ψt−1) = 1√
2piσ2k
exp
−
(
yi,t − x′i,tβk
)2
2σ2k
 . (A2)
Let f(yt | Ψt−1) denote the joint unconditional density function for all observations of the
dependent variable in time t, where yt denotes the set of observations for every individual at
period t, yt ≡ {y1,t, y2,t, ..., ynt,t}, and nt is the number of individual for which data is available
at time t. Each iteration begins with the input P (St−1 = j|Ψt−1) for every j ∈ {1, ..., S} and
has the output P (St = k|Ψt) and the process requires an initial condition for P (S0 = j).
The ﬁltering procedure takes as given the parameters βk, σk, and pjk for all j, k. Maximum
likelihood estimates for these parameters can be obtained by maximizing the joint density
function for all the data (the output from the ﬁltering procedure) with respect to these
parameters. The ﬁltering algorithm follows these steps:
• Step 1: Find probabilities for being in each regime in time t, given information up
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through period t− 1. These probabilities are given by,
P (st = k | Ψt−1) =
S∑
j=0
P (st = k|st−1 = j)P (st−1 = j|Ψt−1),
where P (st = k|st−1 = j) ≡ pjk is the Markov switching parameter, and P (st−1 =
j|Ψt−1) is known from the previous iteration (or initial condition).
• Step 2: Evaluate the conditional joint density function f(yt | Ψt−1) which is computed
by evaluating the following successive densities:
f(yt | st = k,Ψt−1) =
nt∏
i=1
f(yi,t | st = k,Ψt−1),
f(yt | Ψt−1) =
S∑
k=1
f(yt | st = k,Ψt−1)P (st = k | Ψt−1).
The ﬁrst equation is valid since ei,t and ei′,t are independent for i 6= i′, and the density
f(yi,t | st = k,Ψt−1) is given in equation (A2). In the second equation P (st = k | Ψt−1)
is given from step 1.
• Step 3: Evaluate the updated probability for being in each regime in time t, given
information up through period t− 1. These probabilities are given by,
P (st = k | Ψt) = P (st = k | yt,Ψt−1) = f(yt, st = k|Ψt−1)
f(yt|Ψt−1)
=
f(yt | st = k,Ψt−1)P (st = k|Ψt−1)
f(yt|Ψt−1) ,
where the densities and probability needed to evaluate the second line are given in steps
1 and 2.
• Step 4: Return to step 1 until t = T , where T is the number of periods in the sample.
The joint distribution for all the data is given by,
f(yT |ΨT−1) =
T∏
t=1
f(yt | Ψt−1), (A3)
where f(yt | Ψt−1) is given from step 2. Taking logs, this can be transformed to the log-
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likelihood function,
l(yT ) =
T∑
t=1
log (f(yt | Ψt−1)) . (A4)
Numerical maximization methods can be used to maximize equation (A4) to obtain maxi-
mum likelihood estimates for β(st) and σ
2(st) and transition probabilities pj,k.
B Smoothing Procedure
Once estimates for β(st), σ
2(st) and all the transition probabilities are obtained, one may
use the results from the ﬁltering method to obtain smoothed estimates for P (st = j|ΨT ),
the expected probability of being in each state for every period in the sample, using all the
information from the sample. The smoothing procedure described here is unchanged from
Hamilton (1989) and is described again here for convenience.
The smoothing procedure begins at the end of the sample period, and each iteration
computes P (st = k|ΨT ) as its output from period t = T − 1 to t = 1, taking the output of
the previous iteration, P (st+1 = l|ΨT ), as an input. The starting value, P (sT = k|ΨT ) is
given from the output of Step 3 in the ﬁltering procedure above for time t = T .
• Step 1: Compute conditional density P (st = k|st+1 = l,Ψt) based on output from the
ﬁltering procedure:
P (st = k|st+1 = l,Ψt) = P (st = k, st+1 = l|Ψt)
P (st+1 = l|Ψt) =
P (st = k, |Ψt)P (st+1 = l|st = k)
P (st+1 = l|Ψt) .
Both P (st+1 = l|Ψt) and P (st = k|Ψt) in the last expression are known from Step
1 of the ﬁltering procedure and P (st+1 = l|st = k) is the known Markov transition
probability.
• Step 2: Approximate the full information joint density P (st = k, st+1 = l|ΨT ) according
to,
P (st = k, st+1 = l|ΨT ) = P (st+1 = l|ΨT )P (st = k|st+1 = l,ΨT )
≈ P (st+1 = l|ΨT )P (st = k|st+1 = l,Ψt).
In the second expression, P (st+1 = l|ΨT ) is known from the previous iteration of the
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loop (or the initial condition) and P (st = k|st+1 = l,Ψt) is the output from Step 1.
• Step 3: The unconditional density P (st = k|ΨT ) is given by,
P (st = k|ΨT ) =
S∑
l=1
P (st = k, st+1 = l|ΨT ).
• Step 4: Return to Step 1 until t=1.
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Table 1: Regime Switching Regression Results
Variable OLS Regime 1 Regime 2 Diﬀerence
Constant
4.5789*** 4.0752*** 5.0471*** -0.9719**
(0.2314) (0.2945) (0.3401) (0.4435)
Time
0.0325*** 0.0320*** 0.0323*** -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Age
0.1490*** 0.1890*** 0.1057*** 0.0833***
(0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0228) (0.0305)
Age Squared
-0.0025*** -0.0030*** -0.0018*** -0.0012**
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Experience
0.1054*** 0.0992*** 0.1082*** -0.0090
(0.0066) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0123)
Experience Squared
-0.0024*** -0.0022*** -0.0030*** 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Earned Run Average
-0.0051** -0.0023 -0.0101*** 0.0078*
(0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0047)
Wins/Games
6.0445*** 5.7505*** 6.0059*** -0.2555
(0.2140) (0.2863) (0.3323) (0.4021)
K/IP
0.3175*** 0.1866*** 0.4461*** -0.2595***
(0.0403) (0.0511) (0.0586) (0.0762)
(Pseudo) R2 0.8274 0.8519 -
Pseudo R2RS/OLS - 0.1418 -
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations = 2132,
Number of players = 403, Time period = 1911-1973.
Table 2: Labor Market Regime Changes1
Time Period Regime
1911-1913 Regime 2
1914-1916 Regime 1
1917-1919 Regime 2
1920-1932 Regime 1
1933-1947 Regime 2
1948-1973 Regime 1
1A time period is identiﬁed in a
given regime if the smoothed prob-
ability is greater than 0.5.
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Figure 1: Average Nominal Salary of Pitchers: 1911-1973
Panel (a): Average Nominal Salary
Panel (b): Log Average Nominal Salary
Panel (c): Deviation of Log Salary from Linear Trend
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Figure 2: Smoothed Probability the Labor Market is in Regime 2
